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The precautionary principle
in the light of the public participation principle
Mathilde BOUTONNET*
The precautionary principle is widely recognised by international law and is
found in many conventions. According to the 1992 Rio Declaration for example,
principle 15 states:
“In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as
a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation”1).
Likewise, it was recognised under EU law pursuant to the Treaty of Maastricht,
which was also concluded in 1992 (art. 130R which became art. 174 pursuant to
the Treaty of Amsterdam), and which set, for the European Union, the objective to
promote sustainable growth respecting the environment. This provision further
* Professor, Aix Marseille University
1) S. Maljean-Dubois, Quel droit pour l’environnement?, Paris, Hachette Supérieur, 2008, pp
75-82 ; A. Van Lang, Droit de l’environnement, 3e éd, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France,
2011 para 120-126 [Van Lang, Droit de l’environnement]. Voir aussi G. J. Martin,
« Apparition et définition du principe de précaution » (2000) 239 LPA 7 à la p 9
(L’extenso); M. Boutonnet et A. Guégan, « Historique du principe de précaution » dans Ph.
Kourilsky et G. Viney, dir, Le principe de précaution : rapport au premier ministre, Paris,
Éditions Odile Jacob, 2000, 253 ; Ch. Leben et J. Verhoeven, dir, Le principe de précaution:
aspects de droit international et communautaire, Paris, Éditions Panthéon-Assas, 2002 ; M.
Boutonnet, Le principe de précaution en droit de la responsabilité civile, Paris, Librairie
générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 2005 ; Ph. Kourilsky et G. Viney, dir, Le principe de
précaution : rapport au premier ministre, Paris, Éditions Odile Jacob, 2000; G. Viney, « Le
point de vue du juriste sur le principe de précaution » (2000) 239 LPA 66 ; A. Guégan,
« L’apport du principe de précaution en droit de la responsabilité civile » (2000) 2 RJE 147;
P. Jourdain, « Principe de précaution et responsabilité civile » (2000) 239 LPA 51 ; C.
Thibierge, « Avenir de la responsabilité, responsabilité de l’avenir » (2004) 9 D 577
(Dalloz); D. Mazeaud, « Responsabilité civile et précaution » (2001) 14 RCA 72.
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provides that “Community policy […] shall aim at a high level of protection […].
It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that
preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority
be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay”.
The international and European legal systems have influenced French domestic
law which recognised the precautionary principle soon after, in 1995, in the
“Barnier Act” (art. L. 110-1 of the Environmental code).
According to the legislator :
I. - Natural areas, resources and habitats, sites and landscapes, air quality,
animal and plant species, and the biological diversity and balance to which they
contribute are part of the common heritage of the nation.
II. - Their protection, enhancement, restoration, rehabilitation and management
are of general interest and contribute to the objective of sustainable development
which aims to satisfy the development needs and protect the health of current
generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs. They draw their inspiration, within the framework of the laws that
define their scope, from the following principles:
1º The precautionary principle, according to which the absence of certainty,
based on current scientific and technical knowledge, must not delay the adoption
of effective and proportionate measures aiming to prevent a risk of serious and
irreversible damage to the environment at an economically acceptable cost”.
More importantly, pursuant to the law of 1 March 1995, French law has
adopted a Charter for the Environment which forms part of the Constitution.
Together with the most important texts, i.e. the 1958 French Constitution and the
1789 Declaration of Human Rights, it recognises the environmental principles,
rights and duties as being at the top of the hierarchy of norms.
The precautionary principle is included in article 5 of the Charter for the
Environment which states :
“When the occurrence of any damage, albeit unpredictable in the current state
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of scientific knowledge, may seriously and irreversibly harm the environment,
public authorities shall, with due respect for the principle of precaution and the
areas within their jurisdiction, ensure the implementation of procedures for risk
assessment and the adoption of temporary measures commensurate with the risk
involved in order to preclude the occurrence of such damage”.
French courts have recognised the constitutional status of the precautionary
principle. In the context of a constitutional review arguing the violation of the
precautionary principle by the legislator, the French Constitutional Council
Conseil Constitutionnel) declared2) that the provisions under article 5, “ together
with all the rights and duties defined in the Charter for the Environment, have
constitutional status; that they apply to the Government and to administrative
authorities within the limits of the areas under their jurisdiction”.
Thus in France, the legislator must comply with the precautionary principle
and it must be enforced by public authorities. Where there is a risk of significant
damage to the environment, measures must be taken to remedy the situation,
despite the lack of scientific certainty.
During this conference, we will look at two topics that give rise, in France, to
an inventive way of applying the precautionary principle and that provide food for
thought as to the conditions for its implementation, both in terms of process and
substance. Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and mobile phone masts.
Indeed, both seem interesting as, beyond the precautionary principle, they each
highlight, in their own way, the connection between the precautionary principle
and the principle of public participation in environmental public decisions. Let us
explain such connection (1) before we look at each topic in turn (2 and 3).
1. The connection between the precautionary principle and the public
participation principle
To begin with, the precautionary and public participation principles are
certainly independent and the latter is not subject to the former. Arising from
international law (the Aarhus Convention), it is recognised under French law and
has also acquired constitutional status.
2) Décision nº 2008-564 DC du 19 juin 2008, OGM Act, JO 26 juin 2008.
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Article 7 of the Charter for the Environment states as follows:
“Everyone has the right, in the conditions and to the extent provided for by
law, to have access to information pertaining to the environment in the possession
of public bodies and to participate in the public decision-taking process likely to
affect the environment.”
A connection must however be established between the two principles, for two
reasons :
On the one hand, the implementation of the precautionary principle requires
that risk assessment procedures be put in place. The aim here is to determine the
significance of risks and their degree of scientific uncertainty. It so happens that in
France, even though this is not automatic and depends on certain conditions set by
the legislator, French law provides for an assessment system with respect to
“significant” or “material” environmental impacts which, subject to a number of
conditions, involves the participation of the public. This assessment relates to
projects and programmes impacting the environment and which are regulated by
general or specific regimes. Such assessment may then find that certain risks exist
which, even though uncertain, are caught by the precautionary principle.
This is the case for example pursuant to the European measures for the
protection of habitats, taken by directive 92/43 dated 21 May 1992. This directive
established a network which aims to “promote the maintenance of biodiversity,
taking account of economic, social, cultural and regional requirements”. It is
referred to as Natura 2000. It is provided that certain projects “likely to have a
significant effect on a Natura 2000 site, either individually or in combination with
other plans or projects, shall be subject to appropriate assessment of their
implications for the site in view of the site’s conservation objectives”. The opinion
of the vast majority of the doctrine interpreting European Union case-law is that
such assessment also relates to uncertain risks: it is the “possibility” rather than
the certainty of a material impact which calls for the assessment of such impacts3).
Such assessment necessarily leads to public participation which is regulated by the
Environmental code. In practice, the public may, after receiving information from
the competent authority, make observations, including on uncertain risks. Through
3) E. Truilhé-Marengo, Droit de l’environnement de l’Union européenne, Larcier 2015.
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these observations, the public takes part in the social assessment of uncertain risks.
On the other hand, with regard still to the assessment, while it mostly requires
the involvement of scientific experts, the notion of risk is a deeply social one
which, according to a number of authors4), deserves to be debated within society,
via public participation. More specifically, the precautionary principle brings out
the issue of social acceptability of a risk that is potentially serious, scientifically
uncertain and whose management has significant economic and social
consequences. The precautionary principle thus raises the question of risk
acceptability not solely from a scientific perspective, but also from a social one. In
our view, given the scientific uncertainty and the various economic, ecological and
social interests at stake, the degree of social acceptability should only be
determined by a debate amongst civil society. In line with this view, the
communication of the European Commission on the precautionary principle (2
Feb. 2000) insists on the importance of risk acceptability and, to achieve this, of a
dialogue between stakeholders. Public participation therefore appears to be an
essential tool for the “precautionary” management of health and environmental
risks.
This is why in substance a number of measures for the management of serious
and uncertain environmental and health risks turn out to be based directly both on
the precautionary principle and on the public participation principle. One example
is the regime regulating genetically modified organisms (GMOs).
2. The law of 25 June 2008 regulating genetically modified organisms (GMOs).
The risks surrounding the farming and marketing of GMOs give rise to
substantial debates in France, as in the rest of the world, as to their consequences
on health and the environment. There is great scientific controversy about these
risks, which are uncertain and therefore justify the application of the precautionary
principle, as clearly pointed out by the European Court of Justice5). In France,
article L. 531-1 and the subsequent articles of the Environmental code
implementing European directive 2001/18 of 12 March 2001 regulate the
contained use, deliberate release and placing on the market of GMOs.
4) Ch. Noiville, Du bon gouvernement des risques, Le droit et la question du risque acceptable,
PUF 2003.
5) CJCE, 21 mars 2000, Greenpeace France, aff. C-6/99, point 44.
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For the purpose of our presentation, we are particularly interested in the regime
governing the release of GMOs. The term “deliberate release” is defined by the
EU legislator as “any intentional introduction into the environment (…) for which
no specific containment measures are used (…)”. Indeed, in addition to
demonstrating a strong cooperation between the member State and the European
Commission, this regime relies on a system of risk assessment on a long term,
case by case, basis which is required in order to obtain the authorisation for
release which is granted by the competent state authority, i.e. the Minister for the
environment.
According to article L. 531-2-1 of the Environmental code, « decisions to grant
authorisations relating to genetically modified organisms shall only be taken after
a prior independent and transparent assessment of the risks for the environment
and human health. This assessment shall be carried out by a group of experts in
accordance with the principles of competence, pluralism, transparency and
impartiality”.
Such collective expertise is the responsibility of the High Council for
Biotechnology whose « missions are to assist the Government on all matters
relating to genetically modified organisms or any other biotechnology and to
deliver opinions with respect to the assessment of environmental and human health
risks » (L.531-3).
On this particular point, the Constitutional council, in its aforementioned ruling
of 19 June 2008, clearly stated that « by the combination of these provisions, the
legislator has taken adequate measures to guarantee the respect by public
authorities of the precautionary principle with regard to genetically modified
organisms ». In other words, this prior authorisation procedure which includes
assessments prior to authorisation together with a continuous monitoring of risks
following such authorisation is considered to be a concrete demonstration that the
legislator is applying the precautionary principle.
This is of particular interest in the context of our subject as participation of the
public is included in this prior authorisation procedure. It is integrated within the
administrative process of authorisation subject to risk assessment.
The law states that « the freedom to consume and produce products with or
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without GMOs, without this being harmful for the environment and the specific
nature of conventional and quality crops, is guaranteed with due respect to the
principles of precaution, avoidance, information, participation and liability which
are inscribed in the 2004 Charter for the Environment and in compliance with
community provisions” (art. L. 531-2-1). More importantly, it further provides,
with regard to public participation, that “The State ensures effective information
and participation of the public at an early stage prior to taking any decisions
authorising (or not) the deliberate release into the environment and the placing on
the market of genetically modified organisms (art. L. 533-9 Environmental Code).
Hence the connection between precaution and participation to enable the public
to take part in the public decision to authorise the farming or trade of GMOs.
What does this idea of public participation entail, as a reflection of the
precautionary management of risks at stake?
In practical terms, participation can take place in two ways.
On the one hand, indirect participation through the High Council for
Biotechnology. The Council is responsible for advising on matters including
authorisations in the light of the risks incurred. Indeed, such advice is the result of
a cooperation between various members of the committees, a scientific committee
and a non-scientific committee. The latter is the economic, ethical and social
Committee which includes representatives of a number of associations,
representatives of professional organisations, a member of the National
consultative ethics committee for health and life sciences, a deputy (député) and a
senator (sénateur) which are both members of the Parliamentary office for the
evaluation of scientific and technological choices, and representatives of
associations of local authorities. These are meant to be the representatives of civil
society…
On the other hand, a more direct participation. The law provides that the public
must be, first of all, informed and then consulted. Informed because the farmer
who has an interest in the authorisation request must enclose with the
authorisation request a file including information that is not considered
confidential, bearing in mind that this requirement does not apply to low risks.
More specifically, the authorisation request for GMOs which are not intended to
113OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW No. 63 (February 2016)
be put on the market must be accompanied by “an information sheet intended for
the public stating the following” (article L.533-9):
1º The aim and planned uses of the release ;
2º The name and address of the applicant ;
3º The summary description and location of the release ;
4º The general description of the genetically modified organism(s) ;
5º The methods and plans to monitor operations and for emergency
intervention ;
6º The summary of the assessment relating to impacts and risks on the
environment.
At this stage the competent administrative authority will consult the public by
electronic means on the authorisation request, except with respect to any
confidential information, in order to collect observations.
To achieve this, a notice published in the Official journal of the French
Republic (Journal Officiel de la République française) no less than fifteen days
prior to the launch of the consultation process must announce the conditions and
duration of such consultation process which may not last less than fifteen days.
This law thus shows that the assessment involving participation is partly
connected to the precautionary principle. Indeed, the public gives its opinion on
the uncertain risks and therefore on the degree of acceptability of the risk
involved. This system appears to be quite weak however. The consultation process
takes place only after the public has been informed, carries no real weight and no
real social debate is organised to assess the social acceptability of a serious and
uncertain risk.
Yet the idea of a social debate on this topic is not unknown to French law. One
must recall that a Consensus conference took place in France with regard to
GMOs in 1998. The aim was to debate with the public of the risks relating to
GMOs, of their pros and cons. The legislator could have taken up this idea to
schedule similar conferences on a regular basis so that the public may get involved
in the public decision process together with policy makers. The legislator made no
such choice.
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Given these shortcomings, the public is eager to participate and thus be
involved in state decisions regarding GMO-related risks. This can be seen in a
number of ways.
First of all, it must be pointed out that social controversy gave rise, in
December 2010, to the first European citizenship initiative aiming to freeze GMO
authorisations. According to article 11-4 of the Treaty of Lisbon, European citizens
have the right to ask the European Commission, within the realm of its
jurisdiction, to submit an adequate proposal to the European parliament and
Council of the European Union. It is necessary to collect the approval of one
million citizens of the Union who must be nationals of a significant number of
Member States. It is also required that the requested legal act be “necessary for the
purpose of implementing the treaties”. This initiative may have failed for reasons
of validity (such initiatives could not be launched before 2012), nevertheless it
does show the extent to which the public wishes to take part in risk management
when it comes to serious but uncertain risks.
In addition to that, participation of the public can be seen in litigation
proceedings which, in this area, are significant6). Authorisations or refusals with
regard to the placing on the market or release of GMOs thus give rise to disputes
before the courts, on the basis of a control of their legality. There are many cases
opposing the State to associations protecting the environment or GMO producers.
Furthermore, the courts are also called upon to remind mayors that they have no
power to issue municipal decrees prohibiting the farming of GMOs on their
Municipality, as such authorisations fall within the competence of the State.
Finally, there is a portion of the public which is very hostile towards the
farming and placing on the market of GMOs and which resorts to violent and
illegal means of protest, prohibited under criminal law. This is a militant form of
participation in the public decision-making aimed at enforcing the precautionary
principle. Indeed, on several occasions, a number of citizens reaped GMO corn
fields that were intended for scientific research. They are now known as “GMO
reapers” and are regularly prosecuted by criminal courts on the grounds of
“destruction of property”.
6) A. Van Lang, Droit de l’environnement, PUF, 2012, nº 133 et s.
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In order to understand, one must recall that, under French law, the doctrine
very quickly envisaged that the precautionary principle could lead to an increase in
“criminal prosecutions of public or private decision-makers”7). As the
precautionary principle is not a separate offence, the doctrine was wondering then
about the possibility that a failure to comply with the precautionary principle may
be sanctioned through certain accusations into which it could be inserted.
However, looking at the case-law, litigants have tended to rely more on justifying
facts. Under French criminal law, justifying facts are circumstances which justify
or legitimate offences. Such is the case of the state of necessity. Pursuant to article
L. 122-7 of the French Criminal Code, the state of necessity refers to the situation
in which a person finds herself, which leaves no other choice to such person, in
order to safeguard a higher interest, than to accomplish an act which is prohibited
under criminal law.
In order to justify the reaping of GMOs (destruction of another person’s
property), the defendants have in fact argued the state of necessity. According to
them, in the face of the current and serious danger incurred as a result of GMO
farming, and given the State’s failure to implement the precautionary principle, it
is necessary to carry out the destruction of property. While a number of trial
judges have been seduced by this analysis8), the Court of Cassation (Cour de
Cassation) clearly rejected it9). It provides that the state of necessity is not
characterised as there is no evidence of any danger. More importantly, it adds that,
if there was indeed a failure by the State to comply with the precautionary
principle, the defendants should use legitimate legal proceedings to challenge such
shortcomings, rather than actions that may damage other people’s property.
One can therefore conclude that while the management of serious and
uncertain risk calls for the precautionary principle to be applied in conjunction
with the principle of public participation, the effectiveness and efficiency of such a
connection remains fragile given that they depend on conditions set by law.
7) G. Viney et Ph. Kourilsky, Le principe de précaution, Rapport au Premier ministre, éd. O.
Jacob, 2000.
8) T. Corr. Foix, 3 oct. 2000, D. 2001, JP, p. 1357 ; T. Corr. Orléans 9 décembre 2005)
9) v. Cass. crim., 28 avril 2004, nº 03-83.783 ; crim. 18 fév. 2004, nº 03-82.951 ; crim. 27
mars 2008, nº 07-83.009 ; crim 7 février 2007, nº 06-80.108 ; crim. 4 avril 2007, nº 06-
80.512 ; crim. 31 mai 2007, nº 06-86.628 ; réc. crim. 3 mai 2011, nº 10-81.529.
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The same observation can be made when we look at the case of mobile phone
masts.
3. Mobile phone masts
A great paradox surrounds mobile phone masts at the moment. On the one
hand, the French State is required to cover the entire territory with mobile phone
masts in order to efficiently and equally satisfy the citizens’ demands in terms of
communications. On the other hand, citizens are suspicious of the electromagnetic
waves thus generated because of the potential health risks demonstrated by a
number of scientific papers and they challenge these in court. The increase in
litigation may however undermine the process of covering the entire territory.
Mobile phone masts are therefore a perfect example of the difficulties
surrounding the precautionary principle10). The risk associated to these masts needs
to be managed in a delicate and reasoned manner in the context of scientific
uncertainty. This is why the implantation of a mobile phone mast is regulated by
the State which is the competent authority to implement the precautionary
principle. Such implantation requires two authorisations. The first one is granted
by the French Electronic communications and postal regulatory authority (Autorité
de régulation des communications électroniques et des postes) (ARCEP), pursuant
to article L. 42-1 of the Postal and electronic communications code (CPCE). Such
authorisation specifies the conditions pertaining to the use of the frequency, in
particular to prevent interference and reduce exposure of the public to
electromagnetic fields. The second authorisation is granted at a local level by the
National agency of frequencies (Agence nationale des fréquences)(ANFR) which is
in charge of coordinating the implantation throughout the country of radio stations
in order to ensure the best possible use of available locations and compliance with
the limit values with regard to public exposure to electromagnetic fields (decree of
3 May 2002)11).
Furthermore, it must be noted that the construction of mobile phone masts falls
10)G. Viney, L’influence du principe de précaution sur le droit de la responsabilité civile à la
lumière de la jurisprudence : beaucoup de bruit pour presque rien ?, Dalloz 2013, p. 562 ;
D. Mazeaud, La responsabilité du fait des ondes, Mélanges J. L. Baudouin, éd. Y Blais
2012, p. 871.
11)M. Bacache, RTD civ. 2014, p. 176.
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within the scope of planning regulations requirements. Depending on the height
and surface area of the facility, a prior declaration at the town hall or a request for
a construction permit must be made. Within 15 days following the filing of the
request, and, during the related inquiry of such request (1 or 2 months depending
on the circumstances), the mayor must display in the town hall a notice regarding
the filing of a request for a permit or a prior declaration. During this period of
time, the informed public may consult the file. However, this information process
does not give rise to comments and remains limited as it does not include any
assessment of environmental impacts. The potential risk arising from mobile phone
masts is therefore borne by the locals. More importantly, this leads to a lack of
social debate as to the acceptability of the health risk surrounding mobile phone
masts.
As a result of this, it is not surprising that the last few years have seen a
growing amount of litigation in this respect. This is the second form of significant
public participation : access to the courts to challenge public decisions made in a
scientific context. Being of the opinion that the implantation of mobile phone
masts does not comply with the precautionary principle, associations constituted of
members of a same local area near the mast institute proceedings before
administrative or civil courts. Keep in mind that under French law, there is an
important distinction : the administrative courts have jurisdiction over disputes
involving the administration and the civil courts have jurisdiction over disputes
between private persons.
To start with, with regard to the Council of State (Conseil d’Etat) (the highest
jurisdiction for administrative matters), this council has agreed to examine the
legality of decisions relating to implantation authorisations for mobile phone masts
in the light of the precautionary principle12). However, the result of such
proceedings is not in favour of the claimants. Looking at the administrative case-
law, two observations can be made. First, as in the case of GMOs, the State, and
no one else, is responsible for determining the conditions for implantation of
mobile phone masts across the country and the measures to be taken to protect the
public from the effects of waves. Thus the mayor is not competent to specify any
particular conditions13). In other words, risk management is the sole responsibility
12) CE 19 juillet 2010, nº 328687, Assoc. Quartier les Hauts de Choiseul.
13)V. 3 arrêts du CE, 26 oct. 2011, nº 326492/329904/341767.
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of the State. In exceptional circumstances, when the mayor opposes a request for
implantation of a mobile phone mast, he or she must prove that such refusal is
justified by the risks incurred in the current state of scientific knowledge, even if
uncertain14). On the other hand, while the council has agreed to examine the
legality of authorisations in the light of the precautionary principle, the Council of
State considers that the risks remain insufficiently proven to challenge such
authorisation. Furthermore, it prioritises the need for the State to cover the
territory on behalf of the general interest. We note therefore that under the pretext
of enforcing the precautionary principle, by requiring the proof of risks that are
sufficiently proven, the court makes a wrong application of the avoidance
principle.
Secondly, public participation through access to the courts can be seen before
the civil court, whose jurisdiction relates to disputes between private persons15).
This civil case-law with regard to mobile phone masts is very significant as it
shows the extent to which the concerned public uses legal proceedings to
challenge risks that have been previously approved by the State. Going before the
civil court is a means to stand against the State’s action which, in this area,
imposes health risk onto citizens. When such risks exist but are not chosen, they
can be challenged using legal means.
It was not a given that such proceedings would take place. One must indeed
keep in mind that, in theory, according to article 5 of the Charter for the
Environment, the precautionary principle is to be enforced by the Government. It
is not meant for private persons, in this case mobile phone operators. However,
from a very early stage, the doctrine did wonder about its influence on private law
and the vast majority argued in favour of its extension to private persons, such as
businesses. Civil courts have agreed with this doctrine. Thus, thanks to the court’s
power of interpretation, in France, both public and private decision-makers are
considered competent when it comes to the precautionary principle.
Mobile phone masts happen to be a typical symbol of the extension of the
precautionary principle. One must look here at a number of rulings made by trial
14) CE 30 janvier 2012, nº 344992.
15)M. Boutonnet, « Les risques éventuels générés par les antennes relais de téléphonie-mobile
devant le juge civil », Gaz. Pal. 2009, nº 326/328, p. 11.
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judges in civil law matters. The facts are always similar : a number of people
living near a mobile phone mast and arguing that this mast is causing health risks
which are uncertain but may potentially be serious, institute legal proceedings
against the relevant mobile phone operator. They request that the court put an end
to such risks by ordering the dismantling or prohibition of the mast.
When ruling in favour of such requests, the courts have relied on two types of
reasoning.
On the one hand, the vast majority of rulings is based on the law relating to
nuisance (théorie des troubles anormaux du voisinage), combined, expressly or
implicitly, with the precautionary principle. Under French law, this concept enables
anyone suffering as a result of a disturbance that goes beyond what you would
normally expect in the context of neighbourly interactions to request compensation
for and cessation of such nuisance. This concept was created by a judge in 1844
with regard, at the time, to industrial nuisance.
To justify the cessation of risks and put an end to the set-up of mobile phone
masts, rulings provide that the fact that it is impossible to guarantee the absence of
any health risk constitutes a nuisance (trouble anormal). In other words, even
though the risk is uncertain, there is a nuisance because the lack of evidence that
there is no risk leads to the characterisation of a nuisance. Another way of saying
this is that the lack of safety with respect to a mobile phone mast may lead to the
legal qualification of a nuisance.
Such rulings include the decision of the Grasse High Court of 30 June 2003,
the judgment of the Versailles Court of appeal of 4 February 200916) upholding the
decision of the Nanterre High court dated 18 September 200817). In this case, the
judgment is interesting as, after acknowledging that the standards defined by the 3
16) P. Jourdain, « Risque et préjudice (suite): réparation au titre des troubles du voisinage du
préjudice généré par la présence d’antennes relais de téléphone mobile » [2009] RTD civ
327 ; M. Boutonnet, « Point de vue » [2009] D Juris 499 ; G. Courtieu, « Proximité d’une
antenne relais de téléphonie mobile » [2009] RCA Comm 75. Voir aussi B. Mallet-Bricout et
N. Reboul-Maupin, « Droit des biens » [2009] D Pan 2300.
17) Trib gr inst Nanterre, 18 septembre 2008, (2008) D Jur 96 (comments : M Boutonnet)
[Nanterre, 2008]. Voir Trib gr inst Toulon, 26 mars 2006, (2006) Droit de l’environnement
164 (comments : D. Deharbe et E. Hicter).
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May 2002 decree relating to the generation of electromagnetic waves had been
complied with, the court considered that doubts remained as to their impact on
health and concluded that there was a “legitimate concern which constitutes a
nuisance”.
On the other hand, some courts have turned out to be even bolder. One
example is the decision of the Nevers High Court dated 22 April 201018). In this
particular case, the court refused to apply such law relating to nuisance (théorie du
trouble de voisinage) which, according to this court, is only relevant if there is a
risk that is certain. The court rejected the fiction and interpretation made of this
concept. The ruling was based solely on the precautionary principle as a general
principle of the law. After acknowledging the great scientific uncertainty and the
significance of the risk, the court did not order that the operator dismantle the
mast, but that it carry out additional research on the risks at stake and, depending
on its findings, find a more adequate location.
This ruling is interesting for several reasons19): to start with, it recognises the
victims’ request without taking into account the fact that the operator complied
with the standards on the generation of telephone waves. It considers that
uncertain risks remain despite compliance with such standards and that those risks
must be managed with the precautionary principle in mind. This means that the
public may challenge decisions that comply with the standards set by the State
despite the fact that such decisions may potentially be compliant with the
precautionary principle. Secondly, this ruling aims to provide a solution which is
respectful of the interests of both parties. It tries to achieve a conciliation of
interests: to carry out one’s business without harming others. In this sense, it
complies with the legal conditions of the precautionary principle which is in itself
mindful of the need for conciliation. In other words, through legal proceedings, the
public calls for the judge to start a dialogue in favour of a better acceptability of
the risk by society and the persons who are subject to such risk.
This entire case-law has been questioned by the doctrine as, ultimately, it
allows certain victims to put an end to operations that benefit a large number of
18) Trib gr inst Nevers, 22 avril 2010, (2010) nº 10/00180. V. le commentaire de C. Sintez,
Revue assurances-responsabilite civile-assurances, nov. 2010/11, comm. 275.
19) Sur cette analyse, G. Viney, art. préc., p. 564.
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people. Whereas the proceedings are instituted by one or a few individuals, the
consequences thereof are collective. Indeed, putting an end to the operations has
consequences for the whole neighbourhood and not just for the person instituting
the proceedings. Most of all, it calls into question the competence of the State
which, as reminded by the administrative courts, must cover the territory with an
efficient network while minimising health risks. According to Professor Stoffel-
Munck, “the civil court substitutes its own assessment of the requirements of the
precautionary principle to that carried out by the Government” and “it thus takes
away the effect of the compromise made by the Government between public
interest needs and the degree of scientific uncertainty”20).
Hence, this line of case-law has been challenged before the Jurisdiction Court
(Tribunal des conflits). In France, this Court is important as it is in charge of
maintaining the allocation between civil and administrative matters. In six rulings
dated 14 May 201221), the Jurisdiction Court (in charge of resolving jurisdiction
disputes due to the principle of separation of powers) declared that public
authorities designated by law have exclusive competence to “determine and
monitor the conditions of use relating to frequencies or frequency bands and the
terms for implantation of radio stations across the territory, as well as the
measures protecting the public against the effects of waves”22). This court
concluded that a civil court cannot order the dismantling or prohibition of mobile
phone masts as this would mean that the court would infringe on the State’s
powers. Civil courts are only competent when it comes to compensation or
cessation of a nuisance (troubles anormaux de voisinage) which result from an
unlawful implantation or an implantation which is in violation of administrative
requirements or nuisance unrelated to the protection of public health23). In other
words, while civil courts are competent once the damage is done and must be
compensated for, such court has lost most of its power when it comes to avoiding
20) Ph. Stoffel-Munck, La théorie des troubles de voisinage à l’épreuve du principe de
précaution, D. 2009, p. 2817.
21) Trib confl, 14 mai 2012, (2012) D Juris 1930 (comments G.J. Martin et J-Ch. Msellati) ;
Trib confl 14 mai 2012, (2012) Rec nº 3846 ; Trib confl 14 mai 2012, (2012) Rec nº 3848 ;
Trib confl 14 mai 2012, (2012) Rec nº 3850 ; Trib confl 14 mai 2012, (2012) Rec nº 3852 ;
Trib confl 14 mai 2012, (2012) Rec nº 3854.
22)G. J. Martin et Msellati, ; A. Van Lang, « La clause générale de répartition des compétences
au secours des antennes relais » [2012] AJDA Chron 1525 à la p 1528.
23) Ibid.
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such damage.
The Court of Cassation upheld the decision of the Jurisdiction Court in two
rulings dated 17 October 201224) and a ruling dated 19 December 201225).
The doctrine’s view is that these rulings have put an end to the possibility of
anyone invoking the precautionary principle in front of a judge. Indeed, by putting
an end to the preventive powers of the civil courts, they also put an end to any
proceedings based on the precautionary principle to avoid damages. More
specifically, through the prism of the participation principle as well, they have
extinguished the possibility for stakeholders to challenge a risk which is serious,
albeit uncertain.
Therefore the result of this case-law seems to be that ultimately it is no longer
possible to obtain the cessation of a risk even if it is uncertain as the State has
declared itself competent to manage such risk using a special police power26).
Thus it is the State that determines the acceptability of the risk incurred by the
locals.
Our view is that this case-law is highly debatable. It is true that the ruling of
the Jurisdiction Court can be justified when you consider, as does part of the
doctrine27), that the standards set by the State in terms of wave generation caused
by mobile phone masts take into account the precautionary principle. This is all
the more justified given that the precautionary principle does not mean that any
operations that may cause some risk must come to an end. However, by depriving
the court of the possibility to enforce the precautionary principle itself, it also
undermines the public participation principle. Access to the courts on
environmental and sanitary matters has simply been shut down.
24) Cass civ 1re, 17 octobre 2012, (2012) D Jur 2523, nº 11-19.259 [Cass civ 1re, nº 11-19.259]
; Cass civ 1re, 17 octobre 2012, (2012) D Jur 2523, nº 10-26.854 [Cass civ 1re, nº 10-
26.854] ; A. Van Lang, « La question de la compétence judiciaire dans le contentieux des
antennes-relais : fin ou suite? » [2012] RDI Chron 612 [Van Lang, « Compétence »].
25) Cass civ 3e, 19 décembre 2012, (2013) D Jur 91, nº 11-23.566 [Cass civ 3e, nº 11-23.566] ;
Ph. Malinvaud, « Troubles de voisinage dus aux antennes-relais : où en est-on? » [2013]
RDI Chron 162.
26)V. sous Trib confl, 14 mai 2012, (2012) D Juris 1930 (annotation Gilles Martin et Jean-
Charles Msellati)
27) Ph. Stoffel-Munck, préc.
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However, this topic calls for a necessary debate on the social acceptability of
uncertain risk and for this purpose access to the courts is essential28). Indeed,
according to some quite diverse theories of sociology of law, the judge is the
“living representative of society” (organe vivant de la société)29). It stands as an
intermediary between the State and society as would a “judge Hermes”, to use the
words of François Ost. Applied to environmental and health matters which are
subject to scientific uncertainty, this means that the court should play a role in
assessing risk acceptability by weighing the various interests at stake.
This is all the more true as the role of lawsuits has evolved. They have become
a place where a dialogical and discursive democracy takes place30). Given the
shortcomings of social debate within usual frameworks put in place by the
Government, lawsuits have become a means to challenge the political legitimacy
of certain decisions.
In terms of adequacy, one must also recall the danger of this new case-law. A
health tragedy occurred in France in the nineties, when blood was contaminated
with the AIDS virus, even though the State has fully validated the placing on the
market of the contaminated blood. One can therefore see that legal and political
validity should not be confused. Allowing the State to “determine the risk” also
means allowing it to get it wrong if there can be no judicial challenge.
What are the solutions envisaged with respect to mobile phone masts ?
First of all, one must be aware that victims do have access to a number of
solutions. They can challenge the legality of an authorisation before the
administrative court. However, it is unlikely that such an action would succeed,
such court being against a strict application of this principle. In addition to that,
they may obtain the avoidance of the risk of damage caused by a mast in certain
limited conditions. But it would be difficult to demonstrate once again the
unlawfulness of the set-up of a mast or the fact that the dispute has nothing to do
28) Sur ce rappel, M. Mekki, La ou les légitimité(s) du ou des juge(s) et le principe de
précaution, to be published in Le principe de précaution en droit de la responsabilité civile
et pénale comparé, M. Hautereau-Boutonnet et JC Saint-Pau.
29)D. Salas, Droit et institution, Léon Duguit et Maurice Hauriou, in La force du droit, p. 193.
30)A. Garapon, Bien juger…, p. 229.
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with public health. As a result of this, victims are left only with the compensation
solution. Indeed, once the damage has been caused, the civil courts can reclaim
their power on matters of civil liability. On this particular point, French law is
unique in that it takes into account the precautionary principle where there is a
liability claim which involves judging the wrongdoings of the person causing the
damage. Since a decision rendered by the Hight Court (Cour de cassation) on the
3 march 201031), the violation of the precautionary principle could lead to the civil
liability if there is soma damage. The facts of the case were the following: the
owner of a piece of land where there was a water spring has built a well. The
company who works with this water has considered that it could lead to risks of
water pollution. That’s why this company has sued the owner to obtain damages
with regards to the violation of the precautionary principle. Then, the Court has
rejected the claim because the conditions of the precautionary principle were not
met. It clearly means, that if the risk existed, even if it was uncertain, the judge
would have recognized the breach of the precautionary principle and granted
compensation for environmental damage.
However, these forms of compensation remain last resort solutions. It is
obvious that the locals who live near a mobile phone mast do not seek
compensation but rather to avoid the risk in the first place ! This is why there
should be a focus on the reinforcement of avoidance. As the courts can no longer
address the concerns of the victims through lawsuits, it therefore seems urgent to
reinforce the participation of the public as soon as a proposed mobile phone mast
set-up is considered. It is the only way that the risk can be debated and potentially
acceptable.
In line with this view, a number of mayors are organising public meetings
within their municipality in order to allow inhabitants to be better informed and to
debate with the main players.
Furthermore, a new framework for the monitoring and measure of
electromagnetic waves was put in place by a decree dated 14 December 2013.
This is to ensure that the wave measures respect public health according to state
data. The new decree also created a fund to finance risk management. The decree
31) Émilie Bouchet-Le Mappian, « Le principe de précaution dans un litige entre voisins »
[2010] D 2419; Cass civ 3e, 3 mars 2010, (2010) Bull civ III, nº 08-19.108.
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enables certain people to request such monitoring and to be informed of the wave
measures, including the National Agency of Frequencies, the State, local
authorities, the French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health
& SafetyAgence nationale de sécurité sanitaire de l’alimentation, de
l’environnement et du travail) and a number of associations that work for the
protection of the environment, public health and users of the public health system,
as well as some family associations. According to the doctrine, this decree
complies with the precautionary principle as it enables private persons to
participate in the monitoring of risks32).
However this does not solve the problem entirely. Indeed, while the public now
has access to monitoring of generated electromagnetic wave measures, it would
only be able to challenge such measures if they were in breach of what is required
by the State pursuant to the legal framework.
Hence the feeling remains that in order to be effective, the management of
serious and uncertain risks requires adequate enforcement both of the participation
as well as the precautionary principle by the civil courts.
32)M. Bacache, préc.
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